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Highlights 
• We fully analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in 
diversified populations 
• It is well known that classical snowdrift games maintain the coexistence of 
cooperators and cheaters 
• We clarify that the continuous snowdrift games often lead to assimilation of 
cooperators and cheaters 
• Allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity 
aversion in joint ventures  
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Abstract. It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the snowdrift game can 
lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the 
snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in 
continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% 
contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical 
studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of 
diversity in strategy. Here we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff 
functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which 
gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those 
with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The 
key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of 
different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies 
that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity 
aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly 
accepted notions of fairness. 
Keywords:  evolution of cooperation; snowdrift game; replicator dynamics; adaptive 
dynamics; evolutionary branching; speciation in reverse   
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1. Introduction 
In daily life, cooperative behavior in joint ventures is a fundamental index that represents the 
real state of human sociality and is often a matter of degree that can continuously vary and 
diverge within a wide range. In general, understanding the origin and dynamics of diversity or 
heterogeneity has been one of the most challenging hot topics in biology and the social 
sciences (Axelrod, 1997; MaCann, 2000; Valori et al., 2012). However, most traditional 
game-theoretical studies on cooperation have described the degree of cooperation in terms of 
discrete strategies, such as cooperators who contribute all and cheaters who do nothing. 
Compared with matrix games for finite discrete strategies, games for infinite continuous 
strategies have been relatively little studied (Brännström et al., 2011; Cressman et al., 2012; 
Le Galliard et al., 2005; Hilbe et al., 2013; Killingback and Doebeli, 2002; Killingback et al., 
1999; McNamara et al., 2008; Nakamura and Dieckmann, 2009; Roberts and Sherratt, 1998; 
Wahl and Nowak, 1999a, 1999b). We should note that a common motivation among previous 
game-theoretical models with continuous strategies was to resolve the fundamental question, 
“How altruistic should one be?” (Roberts and Sherratt, 1998). 
Crucially, in the last decade it has been clarified that even without specific assortment, 
very small, occasional mutations on the degree of cooperation can lead subpopulations of the 
cooperators and cheaters to gradually dissimilate each other out of a uniform population 
(“evolutionary branching”) (Brännström and Dieckmann, 2005; Brown and Vincent, 2014; 
Doebeli et al., 2004; Parvinen, 2010). This divergence scenario for the cooperation level has 
been termed the “tragedy of the commune” (Doebeli et al., 2004). Gradual evolution can 
favor such a state in which a sense of fairness may be minimized, rather than a state in which 
all adopt the same cooperation level. To date, theoretical and numerical investigations have 
shown the conditions under which evolutionary branching occurs at the cooperation level, and 
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by also considering ecological dynamics, where even extinction at the population level can 
follow (Parvinen, 2010, 2011).     
Importantly, previous studies implicitly indicated that a heterogeneous population of 
cooperators and cheaters may be unstable when considering a small mutation (Brown and 
Vincent, 2014; Doebeli et al., 2004). To the best of our knowledge, this issue has never been 
seriously tackled, despite the fact that the coexistence of cooperators and cheaters is one of 
most elementary equilibria in classical  2×2  matrix games as described in Eq. (1) and is also 
common in nature and human societies. Indeed, little is known about how continuous 
investment in joint ventures affects what the traditional framework of a two-person symmetric 
game with two strategies has so far predicted (Doebeli et al., 2013; Shutters, 2013; Tanimoto, 
2007; Zhong et al., 2012).  
To address this issue, we consider the snowdrift game (Chen and Wang, 2010; Doebeli 
and Hauert, 2005; Gore et al., 2009; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Kun et al., 2006; Maynard 
Smith, 1982; Sugden, 1986), which has traditionally been a mathematical metaphor to 
understand the evolution of cooperation, and in particular, it can result in the coexistence of 
cooperation and cheating or inter-species mutualism (Fujita et al., 2014; Gore et al., 2009; 
Kun et al., 2006). (The snowdrift game is also well recognized as the chicken or hawk-dove 
game (Maynard Smith, 1982)). The classical snowdrift game for cooperators and cheaters has 
been featured by the rank ordering of the four payoff values:  T > R > S > P  (Doebeli and 
Hauert, 2005; Sugden, 1986), which are given in the  2×2  payoff matrix for cooperation (C) 
and cheating (or defection) (D), 
 
C D
C
D
R S
T P
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
.     (1) 
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We note that if P and S have the other order:  P > S , then this matrix represents the well-
known Prisoner’s Dilemma, leading to mutual cheating (D-D) (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). 
The rank ordering for the snowdrift game indicates that when starting with the D-D state 
where both cheat, for one cheater to switch to cooperation is beneficial to both, yet not so is 
then for the other to switch to cooperation. The following situation may be useful as an 
example: the front porch of an apartment has been covered by a snowdrift, such that getting 
out requires someone to shovel the snowdrift. The situation becomes a sort of snowdrift game 
if a resident is willing to shovel snow and how much snow (C), and a best response for the 
other resident(s) is to shovel less (or nothing) (D). Considering that shoveling time and effort 
can vary continuously, this would naturally evoke a question of “How much would high- and 
low-contributors differ from each other in the snowdrift game?” 
In Sect 2, we extend the discrete snowdrift game to continuous cooperation. Figure 1 
presents an overview encompassing evolutionary scenarios in the classical and continuous 
snowdrift games. In Sect 3, we then investigate the gradual evolution of cooperation with 
small mutations. In the continuous extension we consider quadratic payoff functions for 
interpolating these four payoff values in Eq. (1). It is known that the continuous model with 
quadratic payoff functions is at minimum, required for full coverage of basic adaptive 
dynamics for a population monomorphic with the same level of cooperation (Brown and 
Vincent, 2008; Doebeli et al., 2004) (see also (Boza and Számadó, 2010; Chen et al., 2012; 
Zhang et al., 2013) for effects of more generalized payoff functions). We show that adaptive 
dynamics in the snowdrift game analytically provides a solution whether a population is 
monomorphic or dimorphic. Finally, in Sect. 4 we provide a summary and discuss the model, 
results, and future work. 
2. Models and methods 
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(a) Replicator dynamics for cooperators and cheaters 
We consider the  2×2  matrix game in Eq. (1) in infinitely large populations without any 
assortment. We denote by  PC(n)  and  PD(n)  the expected payoffs for a cooperator (C) and 
cheater (D), respectively, in the population with the frequency of cooperators  n . Clearly,  
 
PC(n) = nR + (1−n)S ,
PD(n) = nT + (1−n)P.
     (2) 
We analyze the replicator equation for the frequency of cooperators  n  (Cressman and Tao, 
2014; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), 
 
dn
dt
= n(PC(n)−P(n)) ,     (3) 
where  P(n) = nPC(n)+ (1−n)PD(n)  denotes the average payoff over the population. Equation 
(3) can be rewritten as 
 
dn
dt
= n(1−n)(PC(n)−PD(n))
     = n(1−n)[n(R−T )+ (1−n)(S−P)].
   (4) 
Therefore, the replicator dynamics in the  2×2  matrix game in Eq. (1) are classified into four 
types by the sign combination of  S−P  and  R−T  (Table 1 and Fig. 2(x)) (Lambert et al., 
2014; Santos et al., 2012; Shutters, 2013). In particular, if and only if  S−P > 0  and 
 R−T < 0  hold, the dynamics have a stable interior equilibrium with 
 
n = S−P
(S−P)−(R−T )
=: nˆ .      (5) 
(b) Continuous snowdrift game with quadratic payoff functions 
We then turn to the continuous snowdrift game (Brown and Vincent, 2008; Doebeli et al., 
2004; McNamara et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2012). Each player in a 
random-matching pair of players has an option to make some investment, which can 
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continuously vary between 0 and  xmax  with  xmax > 0 , to a joint venture. Provided that the 
focal player invests x and its opponent, y, each will receive the benefit  B(x + y)  with respect 
to the accumulated investment  x + y . The benefit is subtracted by the cost  C(x)  which 
depends only on the focal player’s investment  x . Thus, the individual net payoff from the 
one-shot pairwise interaction is  B(x + y)−C(x) .  
We extend the  2×2  matrix game so that the four components of the matrix are 
described, respectively, by the values of  B(x + y)−C(x)  with the extreme levels of 
investment. We assume that a cheater (D) invests  x = 0  and a cooperator (C) invests  
 x = xmax , with  xmax =1  for simplicity. It is straightforward that the traditional payoff matrix is 
described as  
 R = B(2)−C(1) ,  T = B(1)−C(0) ,  S = B(1)−C(1) , and  P = B(0)−C(0) .  (6) 
In the following we assume that the payoff function is quadratic as 
 B(x + y) = b2(x + y)
2 + b1(x + y)  and  C(x) = c2x
2 + c1x . Thus,  B(0) = 0  and  C(0) = 0 . This 
reflects a plausible situation in which no contribution results in no benefit and no cost. Using 
Eqs. (2) and (6),  
 R = 4b2 + 2b1−c2−c1 ,  T = b2 + b1 ,  S = b2 + b1−c2−c1 , and  P = 0 .  (7) 
To fully adhere to the order of  T > R > S > P , in addition to both inequalities: for  T > R , 
 R−T = 3b2 + b1−c2−c1 < 0 ,    (8) 
and, for  S > P , 
 S−P = b2 + b1−c2−c1 > 0 ,    (9) 
it is required that  R > S , namely,  
 R−S = 3b2 + b1 > 0 .     (10) 
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Eqs. (8) and (9) yield that  b2 < 0 : the quadratic benefit function for the snowdrift game 
should be concave. 
(c) Monomorphic adaptive dynamics and evolutionary branching 
We are interested in understanding how the strategy distribution over the population changes 
through imitation of the successful strategies of others (namely, social learning) with small 
mutations in the continuous snowdrift game. We thus investigate this by means of adaptive 
dynamics (Deng and Chu, 2011; Geritz et al., 1997; Geritz et al., 1998). The expected payoff 
for a rare mutant with investment level y among the residents with an investment level  x  is 
 P(x, y) = B(x + y)−C( y) . In the case  x = y ,  P(x,x) = B(2x)−C(x) =: P(x) , represents 
the average payoff over the monomorphic population with  x . The growth rate of the rare 
mutant is the so-called invasion fitness, given by  S(x, y) = P(x, y)−P(x)  in the resident 
monomorphic population with  x . We consider 
 
D(x) =∂ y S(x, y) y=x  which expresses the 
selection gradient of the mutant-fitness landscape at  x . Let  µ(x) ,  σ
2(x) , and  mˆ(x)  denote 
the mutation probability, mutation variance, and equilibrium-population size at  x , 
respectively. Adaptive dynamics for a monomorphic population with  x  is governed by the 
canonical equation  dx dt = (1 2)µ(x)σ
2(x)mˆ(x)D(x) , except around a singular strategy, 
 x = xˆ , at which the selection gradient  D(x)  vanishes. One can set  (1 2)µ(x)σ
2(x)mˆ(x)  to 1 
without loss of generality (Meszéna et al., 2001).  
In the continuous snowdrift game with quadratic cost and benefit functions, we can use 
known results (Brännström et al., 2011; Brown and Vincent, 2008; Doebeli et al., 2004). The 
invasion fitness in the model can be rewritten as 
 S(x, y) = ( y− x)[b2(3x + y)+ b1−c2(x + y)−c1] .    (11) 
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Then, 
 D(x) = (4b2−2c2 )x + b1−c1     (12) 
Thus, there exists at most one singular strategy,  xˆ , given by 
 
D( xˆ) = 0⇔ xˆ =−
b1−c1
4b2−2c2
.    (13) 
From  ′D (x) = 2(2b2 −c2 ) , we know that, in a case that  0 < xˆ <1 , it is (convergence) stable, if 
 2b2−c2 < 0 ; otherwise, it is unstable. Moreover, according to the theory of adaptive 
dynamics, the curvature of invasion fitness at a singular strategy lets us know whether the 
evolution of populations will end at the singular strategy. In the model, the curvature is given 
by 
 
∂ y
2 S(x, y)
y=x=xˆ
= 2(b2−c2 ) . Indeed, the singular strategy  xˆ  is evolutionarily stable so that 
the population at  xˆ  cannot be invaded by any rare mutant neighbors, if invasion fitness takes 
a maximum at  xˆ ,  b2−c2 < 0 ; otherwise (if it takes a minimum at  xˆ ), it is evolutionarily 
unstable so that the population at  xˆ  will undergo disruptive selection to a couple of diverging 
subpopulations.  
Therefore, a necessary condition for the interior singular strategy  xˆ  to be convergence 
stable and evolutionarily unstable (namely, an evolutionary-branching point) is that 
 2b2 < c2 < b2 . Considering  b2 < 0 , this yields that evolutionary branching also requires a 
concave (decelerating) cost function with  c2 < 0 . Therefore, a convex (accelerating) cost 
function with  c2 > 0  will never result in evolutionary branching (Fig. 2(a)).  
(d) Individual-based models 
For the sake of comparison of results in large, but finite populations, we also considered an 
existing individual-based model for the continuous snowdrift game (Doebeli et al., 2004). In 
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the model, we iteratively apply the replicator dynamics to finite populations as follows: first, a 
focal individual  i  and another individual  j  are selected at random. Their respective payoffs, 
 P(i)  and  P( j) , are determined independently after giving each of the two individuals a 
single offer to participate in a public good game. If the focal individual has the lower payoff 
of the two, i.e.,  P( j) > P(i) , it imitates individual  j ’s strategy with a probability 
proportional to the payoff difference  P( j)−P(i) . Second, independent mutations occur in the 
focal individual’s cooperative investment  x , each with a small probability  µ . If a mutation 
occurs, the focal individual’s new value of cooperative investment is drawn from a normal 
distribution with standard deviation  σ , centered at its pre-mutational trait value. 
3. Results 
(a) Coordinate evolutionary outcomes of discrete and continuous snowdrift games  
For parameterization, subsequently, we represent the coordinate system with  d1 = S−P  and 
 d2 = R−T . Considering Eqs. (8) and (9), hence,  b1 = (3d1−d2 ) 2+ c2 + c1  and 
 b2 = (d2−d1) 2 . Using the parameter space  (d1,d2 ,c1,c2 ) , we can overlay classification 
diagrams of evolutionary scenarios for discrete and continuous strategies (Fig. 2). We note 
that the coordinate system  (d1,d2 )  is equivalent with  
(Dg = T−R, Dr = P−S)  which was 
originally reported by Tanimoto and Sagara (2007) and has been commonly shared by 
following application (e.g., Tanimoto, 2007; Zhong et al., 2012; Tanimoto, 2014). For 
simplicity, in what follows we assume that the values of  c1  and  c2  are fixed. 
We then turn to adaptive dynamics in the continuous snowdrift game. It follows from 
Eq. (12) that  D(0) = (3d1−d2 ) 2+ c2  and  D(1) = (3d2−d1) 2−c2 . The selection gradient 
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 D(x)  is linear. One can thus describe the full classification of the monomorphic adaptive 
dynamics in the continuous snowdrift game (Doebeli et al., 2004) in terms of the signs of 
 D(0)  and  D(1)  (Table 2, see Sasaki et al. (Unpublished results) for continuous public good 
games). In a case where  D(0)  and  D(1)  have the same sign ((i) positive or (iii) negative), 
there is no point at which  D(x)  vanishes, and therefore, the population unilaterally evolves to 
(i)  x =1  or (iii)  x = 0 , respectively. For case (ii),  D(0) < 0  and  D(1) > 0 , there is exactly 
one singular strategy, which is evolutionarily repelling (not convergence stable) and which 
divides the strategy space into two basins of attraction for maximal investment  x =1  and no 
investment  x = 0 . For case (iv),  D(0) > 0  and  D(1) < 0 , there is again exactly one singular 
strategy, which is evolutionarily attracting (convergence stable). 
Given a fixed  c1  and  c2 , the intersection of lines  D(0) = 0  and  D(1) = 0  in the  (d1,d2 )
-space is  P = (−c2 2,c2 2) . In the case,  c2 < 0 , it follows that point P is located in the fourth 
quadrant, around which all adaptive scenarios in Table 2 are possible. In contrast to this, 
having an accelerating cost with  c2 > 0  leads to convergence and an evolutionarily stable 
singular point for all points in the fourth quadrant (the region (iv-A) in Fig. 2). 
For cases (ii) or (iv), depending on the curvature of  D(x) , the population state with the 
singular strategy can either be (A) evolutionarily stable or (B) unstable. For instance, the 
combination of (iv) and (B) means that monomorphic populations lead to evolutionary 
diversification into a mixture of full and no cooperation, entitled (iv-B) evolutionary 
branching. 
Finally, with adhering situations under the social dilemma (Dawes, 1980), the 
corresponding natural conditions are that  C(x)  and  B(x)  are strictly increasing within these 
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domains  [0,1]  and  [0,2] , respectively. This requires that  ′C (0) = c2 > 0  and 
 ′C (1) = 2c2 + c1 > 0 , and 
 
′B (0) =
3d1−  d2
2
+ c2 + c1 > 0 ,      (14) 
 
′B (2) =
3d2 −d1
2
+ c2 + c1 > 0 .      (15) 
Considering  c2 + c1 > 0 , it follows that in the quadrant for snowdrift games only, Eq. (15) 
matters (and Eq. (14) holds for all  (d1,d2 )  in the forth quadrant). We note that  ′B (2) > 0  
leads to  R−S > 0 . 
(b) Classify replicator dynamics for intermediate strategies 
We exclusively analyzed the replicator dynamics for two strategies generally given by 
 0≤ x2 < x1≤1  in the continuous snowdrift game. We denoted a dimorphic population with 
these strategies as  X ={(x1,n1),(x2 ,n2 )} , where  ni  represents the frequency of  xi  for  i =1,2  
(thus,	   n2 =1−n1 ). The expected payoff for strategy  xi  for  i =1,2 , then was defined by 
 P( X ,xi ) = n1B(x1 + xi )+ (1−n1)B(x2 + xi )−C(xi ) . We also denoted by 
 P( X ) := n1P( X ,x1)+ (1−n1)B( X ,x2 )  the average payoff over the dimorphic population.  
The replicator dynamics for  x1 ’s frequency  n1  is 
 
dn1
dt
= n1(P( X ,x1)−P( X ))
     = n1(1−n1)(P( X ,x1)−P( X ,x2 )),
    (16) 
where  
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P( X ,x1)−P( X ,x2 )
= (x1− x2 )[2b2(x1− x2 )n1 + b2(3x2 + x1)+ b1−c2(x2 + x1)−c1]
=: F12(n1).
  (17) 
From its linearity, the evolution of  n1  is determined by the signs of  F12(0)  and  F12(1) . 
Considering Eq. (11) yields that  F12(0) = S(x2 ,x1)  and  F12(1) =−S(x1,x2 ) . That is, the sign 
pair of  (S(x2 ,x1),S(x1,x2 ))  (Table 3) can indicate the evolutionary outcome from the 
replicator dynamics. Therefore, the four criteria (I)-(IV) for classifying the replicator 
dynamics for D ( x = 0 ) and C ( x =1) (Table 1) can similarly be applied to any pair of  x1  and 
 x2  on the strategy space  [0,1]  (Table 3). In particular, for the cases of (II) and (IV), solving 
 P( X ,x1)−P( X ,x2 ) = 0  with respect to  n1  leads to a non-trivial equilibrium, in which two 
strategies coexist. The equilibrium frequency is uniquely given by 
 
nˆ1(x1,x2 ) =
−b2(x1 + 3x2 )−b1 + c2(x1 + x2 )+ c1
2b2(x1− x2 )
,   (18) 
as in the supplement of (Doebeli et al., 2004). 
We note that in the model, invasion fitness has already been resolved into two linear 
components: one variable as  b2(3x + y)+ b1−c2(x + y)−c1  and a fixed diagonal as  y− x . 
This leads to the so-called pairwise invasibility plot (PIP) (Geritz et al., 1997; Geritz et al., 
1998), a sign plot of invasion fitness  S(x, y)  on  (x, y) -space, which can be separated by lines 
(Fig. 3). The PIP diagram can provide a useful overview to determine the sign pair for any 
 (S(x2 ,x1),S(x1,x2 ))  and thus the replicator dynamics in any dimorphic population. The 
adaptive dynamics of the population, once degenerated to monomorphism, can then be 
predicted by the four adaptive dynamics criteria in Table 2. In certain cases its dimorphism is 
protected, otherwise, we shall consider adaptive dynamics in dimorphic populations.  
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(c) Dimorphic adaptive dynamics and evolutionary merging 
Previous studies have calculated adaptive dynamics for dimorphic populations when 
 2b2 < c2 < b2 : the singular strategy is evolutionary-branching. We shall show that in the case 
of  b2−c2 < 0 , the dimorphism is destabilized and a reverse process of adaptive diversification 
can occur: the extreme strategies,  x =1  and  x = 0 , can evolve towards the interior singular 
strategy  x = xˆ  with  0 < xˆ <1 . (See Fig. 4 for individual-based simulations.)  
We consider adaptive dynamics for dimorphic populations with distribution 
 X ={(x1,n1),(x2 ,n2 )} . The expected payoff for a rare mutant with  y  is then defined by 
 P( X , y) = n1B(x1 + y)+ (1−n1)B(x2 + y)−C( y) .   (19) 
The invasion fitness for the mutant is given by  S( X , y) = P( X , y)−P( X )  (Geritz et al., 
1997). For the quadratic cost and benefit functions, the adaptive dynamics for the dimorphic 
population  X  with  0≤ x2 < xˆ < x1≤1, are given by 
 
!x1 = m1(x1,x2 )∂ y S( X , y) y=x1
= m1(x1,x2 )(b2−c2 )(x1− x2 ),
!x2 = m2(x1,x2 )∂ y S( X , y) y=x2
=−m2(x1,x2 )(b2−c2 )(x1− x2 ),
  (20) 
where  m1  and  m2  are positive quantities that describe the mutation process in the two 
branches with  x1  and  x2 ; and,  m1  and  m2  are proportional to  n1  and  1−n1 , respectively 
(Doebeli et al., 2004; Meszéna et al., 2001).  
In a case where  b2−c2 = (d2−d1−2c2 ) 2 > 0 , as shown in Doebeli et al. (2004), it 
follows that  !x1 > 0  and  !x2 < 0 , and thus, the two branches are repelling each other. We note 
that the PIP in Fig. 3(d) indicates that for all of two strategies with  0≤ x2 < xˆ < x1≤1, the 
corresponding sign pair in Table 3 is  (+,+) : coexistence (in other words, protected 
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dimorphism). Thus, the adaptive dynamics in Eq. (20) can drive the two branches to the 
boundaries,  x1 =1  and  x2 = 0 , without extinction of either branch. 
What we clarify here is that in the case,  b2−c2 < 0 , then, the dimorphic population 
undergoes bi-directional evolution that leads the levels of cooperative investment in the two 
branches to come closer and closer to each other. Different from the former case, the PIP in 
Fig. 3(e) indicates that for the two strategies given across the interior singular strategy  x = xˆ , 
the possible sign pairs in Table 3 consist of not only  (+,+) , but also  (+,−)  and  (−,+) . Thus, 
in the specific strategies, through the replicator dynamics, either of the two branches goes to 
extinction on the way toward converging to  x = xˆ . This, however, does not matter for the 
evolutionary consequence. The resultant monomorphic population, whether it is from the 
former higher or lower branch, will continue evolving to  x = xˆ . Indeed, the interior singular 
strategy  x = xˆ  is convergence-stable for monomorphic populations.  
This indicates that the continuous snowdrift game with  b2−c2 < 0 , in particular with 
accelerating costs ( c2 > 0 ), will necessarily lead a traditionally differentiated population to 
converge to a monomorphic state with an intermediate level of cooperation (which is a local 
maximum). 
(d) How continuous snowdrift games affect social welfare 
We quantitatively compared evolutionary outcomes from the discrete and continuous 
snowdrift games. So far, we have calculated analytical expressions of non-trivial equilibria. 
Using the results, we accessed the quantitative difference of discrete and continuous 
strategies, which previously have only been discussed for matrix games (Tanimoto, 2007; 
Zhong et al., 2012).  
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First, we rewrite the difference in the cooperation levels at equilibria in Eqs. (13) and 
(18), as follows: 
 
xˆ− nˆ =
(b2−c2 )(2b2 + b1−c2−c1)
2b2(2b2−c2 )
.     (21) 
Then, the average payoff for the monomorphic population with an interior singular strategy 
 x = xˆ  is given by 
 
P( xˆ) =
(b1−c1)(−4b1b2 + 3b1c2−c1c2 )
4(2b2−c2 )
2 .    (22) 
It should be stressed that maximal average payoffs in dimorphic populations, as well as in 
monomorphic populations, cannot be expected to predict the evolutionary outcome. In the 
discrete snowdrift game, at its interior mixed equilibrium  n = nˆ  in Eq. (5), the average payoff 
over the population is given by 
 
P(nˆ) =
(b2 + b1)(−b2−b1 + c2 + c1)
2b2
.     (23) 
Indeed, our numerical investigations indicated that in specific parameters, the adaptive 
dynamics favor the second best equilibria, which bring about a lower level of average 
cooperation and/or payoff over the population (Fig. 5). 
4. Discussion 
So far, we have shown that the continuous extension of the well-known snowdrift game is 
more likely to lead to unification rather than diversification of cooperators and cheaters. We 
analyzed how allowing gradual evolution of cooperative investments can lead to outcomes 
that can qualitatively and quantitatively differ from discrete strategies. In the classical, 
discrete snowdrift game within well-mixed populations, the stable coexistence of cooperators 
and cheaters is a unique evolutionary outcome. Provided that the degree of cooperative efforts 
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to produce common goods can continuously vary, however, this is often not the case. Indeed, 
we find that with a wider range of parameters (in particular in the case of accelerating costs) 
initially heterogeneous populations with high- and low-investment levels will be destabilized 
and merge into a homogeneous state in which all invest at the same, but intermediate, rate. 
Therefore, our analysis explicitly shows that the gradual evolution of cooperation often 
prefers the social inequity aversion in snowdrift games.  
To describe intermediate levels of cooperation, an alternative and fairly trivial way to 
consider this is through the mixed strategies of C ( x =1) and D ( x = 0 ) (McGill and Brown, 
2007). In a mixed-strategy model it is assumed that a player invests 1 with probability  x , or 
otherwise, 0. It is known, however, that this treatment is structurally unstable (Dieckmann and 
Metz, 2006). We remark that the adaptive dynamics are linear with probability  x , which is 
identical to traditional replicator dynamics of frequency  n  in Eq. (3), except for difference in 
the variables. Thus, it is obvious that invasion fitness at a singular strategy is completely flat: 
all strategies when rare can fit equally, corresponding to the results known by the Bishop-
Canning theorem (Bishop and Cannings, 1978). Rare mutants can then sneak in along with 
the residents with a singular strategy by neutral drift, which yet is not predictable by the 
theory of adaptive dynamics.  
It has also been considered that responding to disruptive selection can lead to sympatric 
speciation (Rueffler et al., 2006). By means of adaptive dynamics a mechanism for the 
disruptive selection to occur has become understandable as evolutionary-branching points 
(McGill and Brown, 2007). Interestingly, recent studies on speciation, by analyzing the 
empirical data, have clarified that for a specific kind of white fish, reversed speciation has 
happened in large European lakes, and thereby biodiversity has been greatly reduced 
(McKinnon and Taylor, 2012; Vonlanthen et al., 2012). Analogously, a mechanism for the 
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reverse speciation to occur might be understood through the process of evolutionary merging. 
For instance, these studies of white fish indicated that species differentiation can be reversed 
by environmental eutrophication. Through the continuous snowdrift game, our analysis 
reveals that enriching the game environment, in particular the marginal benefit of cooperation 
in the population of cheaters, can increase the degree of  S−P  in Eq. (1), and thus can 
reverse evolutionary branching, leading to an evolutionary merging of cooperation and 
cheating. 
In previous numerical investigations of spatial snowdrift games, it was suggested that 
spatial coexistence does not always promote the evolution of cooperation (Hauert and Doebeli, 
2004). Our results imply that the coexistence of cooperators and cheaters discrete in the 
structured population could be unstable when considering adaptive dynamics. Similarly, 
applying our approach to discrete games with more than two players or strategies (e.g., 
optional participation in public good games) deserves further investigation (Doebeli et al., 
2004; Sasaki et al., 2015). More generally, evolutionary branching could be considered in the 
context of work specialization or cultural polarization (Axelrod, 1997; Torney et al., 2010; 
Valori et al., 2012).  Evolutionary merging, can for example, suggest that a division of labor 
can be disbanded gradually, not abruptly, in a slowly changing environment. 
On the one hand, our model has been minimalistic in that it only considers quadratic 
payoff functions. Considerable efforts looking at the evolution of cooperation among non-
relatives, on the other hand, have so far clarified supportive mechanisms, such as direct or 
indirect reciprocity, reciprocity on networks, and multi-level selection, and promotion of 
cooperation in a heterogeneous population with cheaters (Rand and Nowak, 2013). Our 
results showed differences in the resultant cooperation level and average payoff in a case 
without such supportive mechanisms. Therefore, another fascinating question would be 
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whether assimilation or dissimilation at the cooperation level would be a better environment 
that enhances social welfare when considering supportive mechanisms. This idea deserves 
further work, for instance, to explore whether evolutionary branching can facilitate the 
promotion of costly selective incentives in the presence of second-order free riders (Chan et 
al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2015). 
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Tables 
 
 Conditions Replicator dynamics for C and D Title 
I  S−P > 0 ,  R−T > 0  Unilaterally evolving to all C By-product mutualism  
II  S−P < 0 ,  R−T > 0  Bi-stable for C and D Stag hunt 
III  S−P < 0 ,  R−T < 0  Unilaterally evolving to all D Prisoner’s Dilemma 
IV  S−P > 0 ,  R−T < 0  Coexistence of C and D Snowdrift 
 
Table 1. Scenarios of replicator dynamics for discrete strategy C ( x =1 ) and D ( x = 0 ). 
 
 Conditions For monomorphism 
For dimorphism across 
singular strategy  xˆ  
i  D(0) > 0 ,  D(1) > 0  Unilaterally increasing to 1 (No singular strategy) 
ii-A 
 D(0) < 0 ,  D(1) > 0  Repelling from  xˆ   
Converging to  xˆ  
ii-B Repelling from  xˆ  
iii  D(0) < 0 ,  D(1) < 0  Unilaterally increasing to 0 (No singular strategy) 
iv-A 
 D(0) > 0 ,  D(1) < 0  Converging to  xˆ  
Converging to  xˆ  
iv-B Repelling from  xˆ  
 
Table 2. Scenarios of adaptive dynamics for continuously varying strategy  x  within  [0,1] . 
 
 Conditions Replicator dynamics for  x1  and  x2  
I  S(x2 ,x1) > 0 ,  S(x1,x2 ) < 0  Unilaterally evolving to all  x1  
II  S(x2 ,x1) < 0 ,  S(x1,x2 ) < 0  Bi-stable for  x1  and  x2  
III  S(x2 ,x1) < 0 ,  S(x1,x2 ) > 0  Unilaterally evolving to all  x2  
IV  S(x2 ,x1) > 0 ,  S(x1,x2 ) > 0  Coexistence of  x1  and  x2  
 
Table 3. Scenarios of replicator dynamics for discrete strategy  x = x1  and  x = x2  with 
 x1 > x2 .
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Figures captions 
 
Fig. 1. Evolution of cooperation in snowdrift games. For discrete strategies, on the one hand, 
the evolution of the strategy frequencies can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and 
cheaters (upper arrows, X0 to B and X1 to B), yet do not help in understanding whether or not 
the resultant mixture is stable against continuously small mutations. For continuous strategies, 
on the other hand, the population converges to an intermediate level of cooperation (lower 
arrows, X0 to A and X1 to A) and can further undergo evolutionary branching (A to B). In this 
case, the population splits into diverging clusters across an evolutionary-branching point 
 x = xˆ  and eventually evolves to an evolutionarily stable mixture of full- and non-contributors 
(B). Otherwise, it is possible that a point where  x = xˆ  has already become evolutionarily 
stable. In this case, the initially dimorphic population across a point  x = xˆ  can be 
evolutionarily unstable, and thus the population will approach each other and finally merge 
into one cluster at the point (“evolutionary merging”).   
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Fig. 2. Classification diagrams of evolutionary scenarios in snowdrift games. We employ 
 (d1,d2 ) = (R−T ,S−P)  as the coordinate system for parameterization. Parameter sets in the 
fourth quadrant,  {d1 > 0,d2 < 0}, lead to the classical snowdrift game. However, parameters 
by which the diversified population of cooperators and cheaters can stabilize against 
continuously small mutations are restricted in the triangle OQR for decelerating costs  c2 < 0  
(b), and do not exist for accelerating costs  c2 > 0  (a). Moreover, the sub-region for 
evolutionary branching to occur is sub-triangle PQR (iv-B). Compared to stabilization of the 
strategic diversity, its destabilization can happen within a wider region of parameters. Indeed, 
in region (iv-A) of (a) and (b), the mixed equilibrium in the classical snowdrift game is no 
longer stable under the continuous game. The two strategies will eventually converge to an 
evolutionarily stable state with an intermediate level of cooperation. In (b), these regions (iv-
A) and (iv-B) are divided by line QR given by  b2−c2 = (d2−d1) 2−c2 < 0 . Lines PQ and 
PR are given by  D(0) = 0  and  D(1) = 0 , respectively. In the shaded regions one of the 
natural assumptions, Eq. (18), does not hold: the benefit function  B(x)  is not increasing. 
Parameters:  c1 = 4.6 ,  c2 =1 (a) or  −1  (b). 
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Fig. 3. Pairwise invisibility plots (PIPs) for the continuous snowdrift game. Each panel shows 
a sign plot of invasion fitness  S(x, y)  in Eq. (11). Due to the linearity of the payoff difference 
with respect to the strategy frequency, the sign pair  (S(x2 ,x1),S(x1,x2 ))  can indicate the 
frequency dynamics between the strategies with  x1  and  x2 . Panel (x) exemplifies the case of 
 (S(x2 ,x1),S(x1,x2 )) = (+,−)  which leads to a unilateral evolution:  x2  dominates  x1 . The five 
sign plots are representative corresponding to the five cases of adaptive dynamics in the 
continuous snowdrift game: (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) are for (ii-B), (i-B), (iii-B), (iv-B), and 
(iv-A), respectively. Parameters:  c1 = 4.6 ,  c2 =−1 ;  (d1,d2 ) = (0.3,−0.3)  for (a),  (0.7,−0.3)  
for (b),  (0.3,−0.7)  for (c),  (0.7,−0.7)  for (d), and  (1.7,−1.7)  for (e).  
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Fig. 4. Individual-based simulations of (a) merging and (b) branching in the continuous 
snowdrift game. Panels show evolutionary changes in the frequency distribution of 
cooperative investment levels over the population (from high to low: red, orange, yellow, 
green, blue, white (for 0)). At the outset of each tree, for (a) the population is at a traditionally 
acknowledged, mixed equilibrium with full-investment ( x =1 ) or non-investment ( x = 0 ) 
and for (b) all have no investment ( x = 0 ). In (a), the dimorphic population will eventually 
merge into a single branch. In (b), in contrast to this, the monomorphic population will first 
converge to an intermediate level and then diverge into double branches moving to the 
extreme states, respectively. Parameters: population size N = 10,000, mutation rate  µ = 0.01, 
mutation variance  σ= 0.005 ; for (a),  b1 = 7 ,  b2 =−1.7 ,  c1 = 4.6 ,  c2 =−1  ( d1 =1.7 , 
 d2 =−1.7 ); for (b),  b1 = 6 ,  b2 =−1.4 ,  c1 = 4.8 ,  c2 =−1.6  ( d1 =1.4 ,  d2 =−1.4 ). In both 
cases the interior singular strategy is with  x = 0.5 . The scaling factor for proportional 
selection is set so as to be greater than the maximal difference over all possibilities of two 
samples.   
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Fig. 5. Sign plots of differences in the average cooperation level and payoff over the 
populations with a classical mixed equilibrium with  nˆ  in Eq. (18) and the interior singular 
strategy with  xˆ  in Eq. (13). Parameters are as in Fig. 2. For each index, the sign is “ +”, if the 
value in the singular-strategy case is greater than that in the mixed-equilibrium case; 
otherwise, “ −”.   
